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Applying the United Nations Trafficking Protocol in the 
Context of Climate Change 
Mikaila V. Smith 
Abstract 
 
Climate change will increasingly lead to widespread environmental degradation which will 
in turn spur large-scale vulnerability, displacement, and migration. This phenomenon is now well 
recognized in the literature, although causal pathways continue to be debated. However, scholars 
and practitioners have so far largely neglected to examine the related ways in which climate change 
will significantly impact the scale and scope of global trafficking in persons. This Comment 
responds to a lack of scholarship on the climate change-human trafficking nexus by exploring the 
predicted impacts of climate change on human trafficking. In light of these forecasted developments, 
this Comment argues that the United Nations Trafficking Protocol contains a textual basis 
through which states may recognize people who have been made vulnerable to trafficking by climate 
change. Finally, this Comment asserts that any apparent or actual consent by those who are 
trafficked is irrelevant within the framework of the Protocol. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
In a 2019 speech on World Day Against Trafficking in Persons, U.N. 
Secretary-General António Guteress recognized climate change as a phenomenon 
that “exacerbate[s] the vulnerabilities and desperation that enable [human] 
trafficking to flourish.”1 Human trafficking, also called trafficking in persons, 
occurs when a person (the trafficker) has a purpose of exploitation and recruits, 
transports, or harbors another person (the victim) through means such as force, 
coercion, fraud, or abuse of [the victim’s] position of vulnerability.2 Exploitation 
in trafficking may take a variety of forms; prevalent examples include forced labor, 
sexual exploitation, and organ removal.3 All forms of human trafficking have been 
prohibited under international law since 2003, when the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
(Trafficking Protocol) entered into force.4 
This Comment addresses instances where a victim has been made vulnerable 
to trafficking through climate change-related processes of environmental 
degradation. This relationship is referred to as the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus, a term that describes the multicausal and multidirectional 
intersection between environmental phenomena spurred by global warming and 
developments in global and regional patterns of trafficking in persons. The nexus 
will be elaborated upon in Section III, but a brief overview may serve to indicate 
where the discussion is headed: in short, climate change will increase natural 
disasters and forced migration. Both of these factors will increasingly make it a 
daunting and complex task to prevent human trafficking and protect vulnerable 
people from exploitative and coercive situations. 
For example, a 2007 study conducted in Bangladesh after Cyclone Sidr found 
that: 
criminal networks began to operate in the disaster-affected region, preying on 
widows, men desperate to cross [an international border] to find employment 
and income, and sometimes entire families. Victims of trafficking were forced 
into prostitution and hard labour, some working in sweatshops. . . . Some 
disaster-affected families also began to collude with the traffickers in order to 
 
1  Conflict, Climate Change Among Factors that Increase ‘Desperation that Enables Human Trafficking to Flourish,’ 
Says UN Chief, U.N. NEWS (July 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/9QEN-U7EC. 
2  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), What is Human Trafficking, UNODC, 
https://perma.cc/QD7G-RCUG. 
3  Id. 
4  United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 15, 2000, 
T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (entered into force Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Trafficking 
Protocol]. 
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earn money. . . . Women-headed households were identified as especially 
vulnerable to human trafficking and the associated forms of exploitation.5 
Research performed in countries such as Bangladesh, the Philippines, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and Cambodia has documented similar post-disaster patterns.6 Although 
much of the available research concentrates on post-disaster upticks in trafficking 
on the Asia-Pacific region,7 this phenomenon occurs all over the world, including 
in the U.S.8 
Many of the cases arising from the climate change-human trafficking nexus 
may lack the level of coercion or force traditionally associated with trafficking 
cases.9 Rather, the victims may have implicitly or explicitly consented to a 
trafficking situation as the least bad choice after a climate-related natural disaster.10 
The lack of full-scale coercion and potential presence of consent raise concerns 
of a protection gap: victims of climate change will remain in exploitative situations 
without the possibility of gaining a protective legal status as a victim of trafficking. 
To address this protection gap, this Comment sets forth a textual argument for 
the inclusion of victims of the climate change-human trafficking nexus under the 
Trafficking Protocol. 
The goal of this argument is to prevent the harm caused by human 
trafficking without vitiating the definition contained within the Trafficking 
Protocol. This is the central tension underpinning this Comment: extending legal 
protection to people who are trafficked as a result of climate change while 
maintaining some limiting factor to reassure administrative agents that this 
solution is, at least in theory, feasible. 
Human trafficking is a massive industry that impacts a significant number of 
people and carries tangible financial repercussions. According to 2017 estimates, 
at any given time, 24.9 million victims of human trafficking are enduring modern 
slavery.11 Sixty-four percent of trafficking victims are in forced labor situations, 
 
5  Sabira Coelho et al., The Climate Change–Human Trafficking Nexus (citing Alice Poncelet et al., A 
Country Made for Disasters: Environmental Vulnerability and Forced Migration in Bangladesh, in ENV’T, 
FORCED MIGRATION & SOC. VULNERABILITY 211–22 (Tamer Afifi & Jill Jäger, eds.)), at 6 INT’L 
ORG. FOR MIGRATION (2016). 
6  See generally id. 
7  For good reason, the Asia-Pacific region will be most impacted by the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus. The region already has a high rate of irregular migration and “extreme 
vulnerability to climate change” due to its “diverse topography.” Id. at 5. 
8  See, e.g., Jasmine Garsd, Human Trafficking is a Hidden Aftermath of Natural Disasters, PUB. RADIO INT’L 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/X97W-RH7D. 
9  See generally id. 
10  Id. 
11  This is likely a conservative estimate. See Human Trafficking by the Numbers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/274N-BJL8; Anna Stephens, Climate Change and Human Trafficking: 
An Investigation into how Climate Change and Natural Disasters Increase the Risk of Human Trafficking and 
How it Can be Intercepted in the Future, LUND UNIV. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABILITY STUD. 9 (2019). 
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spanning sectors such as construction and manufacturing, domestic care, and 
agriculture.12 Globally, human traffickers earn roughly 150 billion USD, per year.13 
Sexual exploitation is a disproportionate source of financial benefit, making up 
sixty-six percent of the industry’s financial earnings, although only nineteen 
percent of victims are trafficked for sexual exploitation.14 
Despite these staggering statistics, human trafficking is a growing problem, 
and there is little reason to think this will change anytime soon.15 The rate of 
successful prosecutions of human traffickers is extremely low,16 and very few 
victims of trafficking are ever detected, offered protection, or provided with the 
services they need to extricate themselves from coercive situations.17 
Climate change likely exacerbates these trends. The planet’s warming results 
in more numerous, severe, and unpredictable natural disasters.18 These disasters 
fall into two categories: sudden onset disasters, such as cyclones, and slow onset 
events, such as sea level rise.19 Both types of environmental disasters commonly 
result in loss of home and livelihood for people in the area.20 
Those with fewer resources initially are especially likely to be impacted and 
face severely limited options for survival post-disaster.21 As a result, they become 
easy targets for recruitment by traffickers.22 Recruitment can take a variety of 
forms, ranging from widespread online advertisements to targeted physical 
approaches.23 Such interactions generally involve promises of easy money, 
housing, or food, with few or no details about the work to be performed in 
exchange.24 This recruitment may occur almost immediately after a natural 
disaster,25 or it may be a more distant result as, for example, when people begin 
 
12  HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 11. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018, 41 (Dec. 2018). 
16 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 11. 
17  UNODC, supra note 15. 
18  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
19  Denise Chow, ‘Time is Fast Running Out’: World Meteorological Organization Warns Climate Efforts are 
Falling Short, NBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/W8ES-LJJ2. 
20  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
21  Id. 
22  KOKO WARNER ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: MAPPING THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON 
HUMAN MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT,  iv, 2 (2009). 
23  Garsd, supra note 8.  
24  Id. 
25  As with the well-documented increase in trafficking that occurs after sudden onset disasters, see 
WARNER ET AL., supra note 22; see Part III.A.1. 
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migration journeys as a form of proactive climate change adaptation.26 In this way, 
climate change compounds existing vulnerabilities and will likely increase the 
situations in which people succumb to coercive situations due to a lack of 
intervening options or support. 
Human migration is another important facet of the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates 
that by 2050 the world will have over 200 million forced migrants, largely due to 
environmental degradation.27 The IOM acknowledges that this may be a 
conservative number. Yet, it is already more than twice the current number of 
displaced people worldwide (79.5 million).28 While estimates vary, top scholars in 
the field confidently assert that the “scope and scale [of migration] could vastly 
exceed anything that has occurred before.”29 
Of course, it is difficult to accurately estimate what number of these migrants 
might become trafficking victims.30 Data about the prevalence of trafficking 
among forced migrants is not yet available.31 But the predicted rise of forced 
migration means that even relatively low rates could have a big impact on global 
rates of human trafficking. For example, if one in four forced migrants became 
trafficked, this would more than double the current number of global human 
trafficking victims. Additionally, climate change may alter the means that 
traffickers use and the type of trafficking that people experience through, for 
example, the increased prevalence of debt bondage.32 Each of these impacts has 
enormous significance for advocates and practitioners. 
A great deal of this migration will be intrastate, with many people moving 
from rural agricultural areas to urban slums, where traffickers often recruit.33 
However, migration across international borders is also likely to increase 
significantly due to climate change.34 As the effects of climate change intensify and 
combine with pre-existing factors, such as violent conflict or a dearth of resources, 
people will travel greater and greater distances in search of safety and 
 
26  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
27  WARNER ET AL., supra note 22. 
28  Figures at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) (June 18, 
2020), https://perma.cc/8B2Y-LSMB. 
29  WARNER ET AL., supra note 22. 
30  Human Trafficking, MIGRATION DATA PORTAL (July 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/QXG3-Q7XM. 
31  Id. 
32  David Brown et al., Modern Slavery, Environmental Degradation and Climate Change: Fisheries, Field, Forests 
and Factories, 0 NATURE AND SPACE 1, 6 (2019). 
33  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
34  WARNER ET AL., supra note 22. 
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opportunity.35 In the face of global populist sentiment and lack of political will to 
support legal international migration, people will increasingly enlist the services of 
human smugglers to make these journeys, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
eventual trafficking.36 Whatever the relative proportions of differing types of 
migration, the effect is the same: increased vulnerability to human trafficking as a 
result of environmental displacement that has disrupted livelihoods and systems 
of support. 
Despite the urgency and significance of the climate crisis for efforts to 
eradicate sexual exploitation and forced labor, the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus has received relatively little attention from policymakers and 
academics.37 Secretary-General Guteress is one of just a handful of public figures 
who has sought to increase awareness of the climate change-human trafficking 
nexus. 38 The IOM is one of the few international organizations that has formally 
begun to publish on the nexus, and their work so far encompasses just one 
publication.39 
The climate change-human trafficking nexus also continues to be largely 
ignored by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the U.N. agency 
tasked with addressing human trafficking through research and policy 
development. For example, in 2018, the UNODC’s 88-page biannual report on 
global human trafficking contained no mention of or reference to climate change 
or the environment.40 
Agencies focused on responding to climate change and natural disasters have 
similarly neglected to address trafficking as a consequence of environmental 
events, despite substantial evidence that supports a positive correlation between 
natural disasters and increased rates of trafficking.41 A thorough review of the 
disaster response and emergency preparedness documents of various U.N. 
agencies, the American Red Cross, and Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
35  John Podesta, The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees, BROOKINGS (July 25, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/224G-85FM. 
36  Brown et al., supra note 32. 
37  Coelho et al., supra note 5. The Vatican is one of the first and only entities to situate its work on 
human trafficking within the context of environmental issues. In 2015, the Vatican convened over 
seventy city mayors to issue a declaration . . . that committed to “reduc[e] exposure [of the poor] to 
climate-related extreme events…which foster human trafficking and dangerous forced migration.” 
Id.; Modern Slavery and Climate Change: The Commitment of the Cities, PONTIFICIA ACADEMIA 
SCIENTIARUM, at 6 (July 21, 2015). 
38  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 3. 
39  Id. 
40  UNODC, supra note 15. 
41  Stephens, supra note 11, at 27. 
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yielded zero documents that mentioned human trafficking as a potential post-
disaster phenomenon.42 
This Comment proceeds in Section II by examining the current international 
legal regime governing human trafficking and interrogating the smuggling-
trafficking binary that currently exists in international law. Section III analyzes the 
mechanisms and predicted impacts that are central to the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus, with a focus on identifying the potential challenges for the 
existing legal regime. Section IV argues that the potential legal protection gap for 
populations impacted by the climate change-human trafficking nexus is in fact less 
prominent here, as the international legal regime on human trafficking already 
contains an existing textual basis to include these types of cases. This Comment 
concludes by centering this legal solution within broader discussions around the 
suitability of various political, legal, and social responses to environmental 
displacement, human trafficking, and modern-day slavery. 
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING  
No existing international legal tool is explicitly aimed at the climate change-
human trafficking nexus. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) “is the principal international mechanism for dealing with climate 
change,” but its focus is almost exclusively on “reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.”43 The UNFCCC does not consider the impact of climate change on 
displacement and migration, much less on human trafficking. In 2015, at the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 21, a formal committee agreed “to develop 
recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address 
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”44 But this has not 
led to tangible impact on international or domestic legal frameworks to support 
migrants displaced by environmental degradation.45 There are several advisory, 
non-governmental groups (such as the Nansen Initiative) that have “propos[ed] 
procedures for the protection of people displaced by climate change,” but these 
proposals have not yet resulted in concrete mobilization or action, and none of 
them address trafficking directly.46 
Of course, climate change and human trafficking are each individually the 
subject of numerous legal and policy regimes and academic studies; it is only their 
nexus that remains widely under-examined. The U.N. has prioritized ending 
 
42  Id. 
43 Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and Human Trafficking After the Paris Agreement, 72 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 345, 360 (2018). 
44 UNFCCC, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 Nov. to 13 
Dec. 2015, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016). 
45  Gerrard, supra note 43, at 361. 
46  Id. 
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modern slavery and human trafficking through the 2030 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG), adopted in 2015.47 SDG Target 8.7 calls for states to take 
“immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery 
and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 
end child labour in all its forms.”48 SDG 13 emphasizes taking “urgent action to 
combat climate change and its impacts.”49 
This Comment argues that the Trafficking Protocol’s definition of 
trafficking in persons appropriately includes people who are trafficked as a result 
of climate-related vulnerability. This argument is rooted in a recognition of the 
significant and wide-ranging consequences of characterizing certain conduct as 
‘trafficking.’50 
First, states are obligated to respond to trafficking with a “range of 
criminalization and cooperation [efforts] both internally and in relation to other 
[s]tates.”51 Second, people whose actions are criminally prosecuted as trafficking 
are often subject to a different legal regime and face harsher sanctions than if they 
were determined to not be partaking in trafficking.52 Finally, and perhaps most 
critically, people who are victims of trafficking are “entitled to special measures of 
assistance and protection that [are] unavailable to those who are considered to 
have not been trafficked.”53 Importantly, the definition of trafficking contains 
both political and legal dimensions, such that “the parameters around what 
constitutes ‘trafficking’ are not yet firmly established.”54 
A.  The Trafficking Protocol  
The primary international legal instrument on human trafficking is the U.N. 
Trafficking Protocol, adopted by the General Assembly in 2000.55 The Protocol 
“is the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on 
trafficking in persons.”56 Crucially, the Trafficking Protocol is only binding on 
 
47  INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO) & WALK FREE FOUNDATION, Global Estimates of 
Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage, INT’L LABOUR OFFICE 15 (2017). 
48  UNODC, Sustainable Development Goals, https://perma.cc/4QQX-DPPQ. 
49  Id. 
50  UNODC, Issue Paper: The Role of ‘Consent’ in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, UNODC 15 (2014). 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  UNODC, Issue Paper: Abuse of a Position of Vulnerability and Other ‘Means’ Within the Definition of 
Trafficking in Persons, UNODC 8 (2013). 
55  Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4. 
56  UNODC, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto 
(2004). 
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ratifying states. As of January 2021, 178 states have ratified and are thus obligated 
to take steps to fulfill the core purposes of the Trafficking Protocol: the 
prevention of trafficking, the protection of trafficking victims, and the promotion 
of international cooperation to meet the first two objectives.57 
The exact scope and scale of required state action is not set forth in great 
detail.58 The Trafficking Protocol is a strong norm-setting instrument and model 
document, but it leaves implementing states with significant flexibility. Thus, 
jurisdictional approaches to anti-trafficking legislation and policies vary greatly.59 
This legal context highlights a significant challenge to the implementation of 
this Comment’s proposed solution. The Trafficking Protocol is a flexible 
instrument, a feature that simultaneously fuels this Comment’s argument and 
limits its impact. Although the Trafficking Protocol is binding on states, the extent 
of each state’s exact obligations is largely discretionary as a result of relatively non-
demanding language used. Thus, the willingness and ability of states to act in 
accordance with this Comment’s analysis and extend protection to victims hinges 
on the political will and available resources of each state. 
These challenges contextualize—rather than invalidate—this Comment’s 
argument, as well as the Trafficking Protocol’s role as “an international framework 
that has impelled a global anti-trafficking movement.”60 The Trafficking Protocol 
sought to formalize a global legal definition of “trafficking in persons” in order 
“to provide some degree of consensus-based standardization of concepts.” 61 This 
in turn could “support efficient international cooperation in investigating and 
prosecuting cases,” “giv[e] a clearer global picture of the problem,” and provide 
global standards for efforts to provide “support and assistance for victims.”62 
Article 5 of the Trafficking Protocol directs signatories to criminalize the 
offense of trafficking in persons as defined below, as well as attempting or 
participating indirectly in trafficking.63 Under the Trafficking Protocol, the crime 
of “trafficking in persons” is defined as: 
 
57  Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2. 
58  For example, Article 5 of the Trafficking Protocol obligates states to “adopt such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to establish [participating in trafficking or being an accomplice 
to trafficking] as criminal offenses.” The details of such measures—including prosecutorial 
processes, penalties, and assistance for the victims—is largely left to each state’s discretion, although 
the Protocol does direct that all measures be “[s]ubject to the basic concepts of the [the party state’s] 
legal system.” Id. art. 5. 
59  Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, Achievements of the Trafficking Protocol: Perspectives from the Former UN Special Rapporteur 
on Trafficking in Persons, 4 ANTI-TRAFFICKING REVIEW 144, 145 (2015).  
60  Id. 
61  UNODC, Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocol Thereto 269 (2004). 
62  Id. 
63  Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5.  
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the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs. . . .64 
The Trafficking Protocol thus sets forth three distinct elements for the crime of 
trafficking in persons: (1) an act, which can be fulfilled by the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, (2) a means by which the 
action occurs or is made possible, and (3) an intent, meaning the purpose behind 
the action, which is required to be one of exploitation.65 
Consider the application of these three elements to an example. The 
following is a description of a 2015 case in the U.S.: 
Andras Janos Vass and two others convinced gay Hungarian men, ages 20 to 
22, to come to the United States under false promises of jobs with good pay. 
The defendants then brought the young men to Miami, Florida, where they 
forced the victims to engage in commercial sex entirely for their own profit, 
working up to 20 hours a day. The traffickers isolated the victims from each 
other, confiscated their travel and identification documents, kept them 
confined to the apartment, and used financial manipulation to keep the 
victims from leaving or seeking help. The traffickers monitored their 
communications with family and with others.66 
The first element, the act, was present from the moment that the defendants 
recruited the victims. That element was further developed when the defendants, 
through financial support and encouragement, enabled the victims to come to the 
U.S. (transportation), and also when they harbored the victims in an apartment. 
Any of these actions on their own would likely have been enough to fulfill the act 
element. Similarly, the traffickers used a variety of means (coercion, threat, 
deception, and fraud), any one of which in isolation would likely have satisfied the 
second element. Finally, the presence of the intent element is extremely well-
supported here. The fact pattern evinces a premeditated and well-planned method 
of exploitation. As this example shows, analysis of individual cases under the 
Trafficking Protocol’s definition is highly fact specific. 
As far as victim protections, the Protocol emphasizes the participation of 
the victim in criminal proceedings against the trafficker by mandating that “[i]n 
appropriate cases and to the extent possible under its domestic law,” a party state 
 
64  Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3.  
65  UNODC, The Role of ‘Consent’ in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, supra note 50, at 24. 
66  NATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING RESOURCE CENTER, TEN YEARS OF SEX TRAFFICKING CASES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 2 (2016). 
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shall provide information on court proceedings and allow the victim’s “views and 
concerns to be presented.”67 Article 6 encourages, but does not mandate, states to 
“consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and 
social recovery of victims” through the provision of housing, counseling, legal 
assistance, medical and material assistance, and employment or educational 
opportunities.68 
1. The Role of Consent 
The Trafficking Protocol specifies that whenever the definition set forth in 
Article 3 has been fulfilled, then the consent of the person being trafficked “shall 
be irrelevant.”69 Although this language seems clear on its face, including terms 
like “abuse of authority” and “abuse of a position of vulnerability” in the means 
part of the definition of trafficking complicates matters.70 As a result, interpretive 
questions remain. In particular, stakeholders continue to debate whether the 
means must rise to the level of impairing or negating the consent of a particular 
alleged victim in order to satisfy the definition.71 
In the U.N. system, the travaux préparatoires are documents that represent 
the “negotiation, discussions, and drafting of a final treaty text.”72 They are 
sometimes used to shed light on ambiguous parts of a treaty. Unfortunately, the 
travaux préparatoires for the Trafficking Protocol are sparse and “do not provide 
clarity” on unresolved issues related to consent.73 This is likely because the 
Protocol’s ambiguous stance is the result of disagreement between non-
governmental organizations and states during the drafting process over “whether 
trafficking should be permitted to occur if an individual consents to the process, 
and, similarly, whether prostitution and sex work are activities to which individuals 
are (or should be) capable of freely consenting.”74 The language that the drafters 
settled on is likely intentionally vague so as to allow implementing states to align 
the Trafficking Protocol to their unique perspective on this issue.75 But it also 
 
67  Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 6. 
68  Id. arts. 6–7.  
69  Id. art. 3. 
70  Kara Abramson, Beyond Consent, Toward Safeguarding Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
Trafficking Protocol, 44 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 473, 477 (2003). 
71  UNODC, The Role of ‘Consent’ in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, supra note 50, at 7. 
72  U.N., What Are Travaux Préparatoires and How Can I Find Them?, DAG  HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, 
https://perma.cc/B6ZX-DRRT. 
73  UNODC, The Role of ‘Consent’ in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, supra note 50, at 27. 
74  Abramson, supra note 70, at 474–75. 
75  Id. at 496. 
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means that the Protocol itself “does little to answer the question of whether 
consent can be accommodated within the parameters of trafficking activity.”76 
The role of consent in domestic legislation varies from state to state. Some 
states emulate the language of the Trafficking Protocol and others implement their 
own explicit considerations of consent.77 In surveying states, the UNODC also 
found frequent differences between what the law says on paper and how law 
enforcement and judicial actors treat consent in practice.78 
For example, U.S. domestic trafficking law contains no explicit references to 
consent, which would seemingly indicate that consent is not meant to play a role 
in the adjudication of trafficking cases.79 But surveyed practitioners agreed that 
issues of consent frequently arise through investigatory and prosecutorial 
processes, including trials, when trying to determine the trafficker’s intent to 
coerce.80 Moreover, practitioners acknowledged that a victim’s clear consent “may 
present an obstacle to successful prosecution and such cases may not be pursued 
for that reason, particularly if the exploitation is at the less severe end of the 
scale.”81 
Academic studies, too, are suffused with disagreement and confusion on 
whether consent is relevant to determinations of when someone is trafficked. 
Depictions of the typical trafficking situation range widely. For some scholars, 
trafficking encompasses only the most extreme examples of coercive or abusive 
situations, such as when a child is directly sold into servitude.82 For others, 
trafficking is more aptly characterized as “an extended form of migration, spurred 
by the same economic and political factors that trigger people to seek the services 
of smugglers.”83 This faction of scholars tends to view people who are trafficked 
less as victims and more as “enterprising people who overcame a lack of options 
at home.”84 
Perhaps seeking to respond to these debates, in 2009 the UNODC issued a 
Model Law on Trafficking in Persons, which offers the following guidance on 
Article 3(b) of the Trafficking Protocol: 
[O]nce the elements of the crime of trafficking, including the use of one of 
the identified means (coercion, deception, etc.), are proven, any defence or 
allegation that the victim ‘consented’ is irrelevant. . . . While being aware of 
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the nature of the work, the person may have been misled as to the conditions 
of work, which have turned out to be exploitative or coercive. This provision 
restates existing international legal norms. It is logically and legally impossible 
to ‘consent’ when one of the means listed in the definition is used. Genuine 
consent is only possible and legally recognized when all the relevant facts are 
known and a person exercises free will.85 
Additionally, growing awareness of the confusion around the role of consent 
prompted the UNODC in 2014 to publish an issue paper on consent in the 
Trafficking Protocol.86 The issue paper’s findings come from surveys of domestic 
legislature and numerous interviews with practitioners and policymakers in 
signatory states to identify areas of confusion and promulgate guidance.87 The 
paper highlights a general consensus that the consent of an alleged victim “should 
not be permitted to trump fundamental human and social values such as dignity, 
freedom, and protection [of the vulnerable]” by preventing prosecution of their 
trafficker or a victim status determination.88 However, interviewees disagreed on 
“what those values are and how they should be understood and applied,” 
indicating that irrespective of the Trafficking Protocol’s text, the issue of consent 
is a live one in many jurisdictions.89 
These ongoing debates over the role of consent must be properly framed. 
Pragmatist actors arguing for strict exclusion of consenting victims are often 
concerned with issues of feasibility. The fear is that if the scope of the trafficking 
definition becomes overly broad, the utility of defining trafficking as a unique 
crime whose victims are entitled to certain legal protections is diminished. This 
broadening may lead to exponential growth in the number of cases and victims. 
This growth will detract from a state’s ability to take anti-trafficking measures and 
protect victims. 
In responding to these “floodgates” concerns about the role of consent, it is 
worth emphasizing the conceptual distinction between defining human trafficking 
and effectively responding to human trafficking. Temporal, financial, and political 
constraints necessarily mean that states have limited resources to prosecute 
traffickers and offer services to people who have experienced trafficking. But 
there “is no limit to how many cases may constitute human trafficking” and the 
applicability of the trafficking definition to one victim’s circumstances do not 
adversely or positively affect another individual’s case.90 This Comment is more 
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concerned with protecting the theoretical application of the Trafficking Protocol 
to all relevant cases. Questions of enforcement and feasibility are certainly 
important, but they are somewhat tangential to this Comment’s argument. 
Under the language of the current Trafficking Protocol, if an act is not 
carried out by way of one of the articulated means, “the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments 
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person,” even if the act is accompanied by 
exploitative intent, then the act is not trafficking.91 The most critical part of this 
Comment’s argument, then, is that victims of climate change are in a position of 
vulnerability as defined by the Protocol. The abuse of this position of vulnerability 
constitutes trafficking, irrespective of the victim’s consent. This argument will be 
elaborated upon in Section IV. 
B.  The Smuggling-Trafficking Binary  
The international legal system treats human trafficking and smuggling as 
completely distinct types of crimes, a framework referred to as the smuggling-
trafficking binary. This binary is already at odds with what practitioners see on the 
ground and acts as a legal concept that allows governments to get out of 
obligations they might otherwise owe to trafficked victims.92 This Comment’s 
discussion highlights how the binary is especially problematic within the context 
of the climate change-human trafficking nexus. 
As climate change progresses, rates of irregular migration across 
international borders will increase.93 In the face of greater border controls, many 
of these migrants will enlist the services of a human smuggler.94 A number of 
factors will cumulatively increase the risk that people who are smuggled ultimately 
become trafficked.95 Strict adherence to the binary thus presents an easy out for 
states. States may categorize many people who are in fact victims of trafficking as 
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people who have been smuggled and are thus deportable and not entitled to 
protection. 
The smuggling of migrants became a crime under international law in 2000 
with the adoption of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Sea and Air (Smuggling Protocol).96 The Smuggling Protocol defines human 
smuggling as: 
the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the 
person is not a national or a permanent resident . . . .97 
The Smuggling Protocol prohibits states from criminally prosecuting 
migrants who have been smuggled but goes on to clarify that “[n]othing in this 
Protocol shall prevent a State Party from taking measures against a person whose 
conduct constitutes an offence under its domestic law.”98 
The Smuggling Protocol makes little provision for allowing people who are 
smuggled to stay in the destination country. Article 18 in fact anticipates automatic 
deportation by requiring states to “facilitate and accept, without undue or 
unreasonable delay, the return of a person [who has been smuggled].”99 The 
Smuggling Protocol makes clear that each state must “take all appropriate 
measures to carry out the return in an orderly manner with due regard for the 
safety and dignity of the person [who has been smuggled].” However, this 
ambiguous language is very different from the specific references to physical and 
psychiatric care for victims in the Trafficking Protocol.100 This difference in 
protections highlights the stakes of the smuggling-trafficking binary. 
In sum, under the current international law framework there are three 
primary distinctions between smuggling and trafficking. First, smuggling always 
involves crossing an international border, while human trafficking may consist 
only of intrastate movement (or, indeed, no movement at all). Second, the intent 
or purpose of the trafficker is to exploit the victim, while the absence of 
exploitative intent (or at least, the same degree of exploitative intent) characterizes 
a smuggler’s actions.101 Third, “people who have been trafficked are (or should 
be) treated as victims, [while] people who have been smuggled are regarded as 
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criminals.”102 This is key to this Comment’s discussion of the binary: the fact that 
“in the case of smuggling, the victim is the state rather than the person who is 
smuggled, whereas, in trafficking, the crime is against the victim of trafficking.”103 
The third distinction is especially problematic within the context of the 
climate change-human trafficking nexus. Increased rates of irregular migration 
and greater barriers to cross-border migration will lead to higher rates of 
smuggling.104 And data suggests that those who enlist the services of smugglers 
will be increasingly desperate and willing to exchange labor in the destination 
country as a way to pay the smuggling fee.105 This makes it especially likely that 
human trafficking will result from a smuggling situation.106 Where an individual 
falls on both sides of the smuggling-trafficking binary, states may focus on the 
fact that they were smuggled in—and are thus deportable—instead of the fact that 
the individual is a trafficking victim, and therefore entitled to protection under 
international law. 
As with so many other areas of international law,107 the disparate approaches 
presented in the trafficking-smuggling binary are also heavily influenced by 
gendered notions of vulnerability and choice. The prototypical trafficking victim 
is a vulnerable and desperate woman who is coerced into sexual servitude or 
forced labor, while the Smuggling Protocol generally envisions reaching “a male 
economic migrant who has weighed his options and chosen to migrate for better 
economic opportunities.”108 In reality, the line between trafficking and smuggling 
is often blurred, and people of all genders may fall under one or both definitions. 
Moreover, the smuggling-trafficking binary encourages states to engage in a 
securitized response towards human smuggling, which likely perpetuates and 
increases rates of violent and exploitative smuggling that more frequently lead to 
human trafficking—a counter-productive result.109 To understand this process, 
consider the different types of barriers that may compel people to seek the services 
of human smugglers: physical barriers, such as crossing a sea, desert, or border 
fence; political barriers, like navigating a violent conflict zone, a heavily militarized 
border, or an impenetrable visa regime; and cultural barriers, such as language 
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differences or ethnic differences that may give rise to suspicion of the irregular 
migrant.110 To overcome these barriers, migrants enlist the services of smugglers, 
who traditionally help migrants to reach their destination safely and often provide 
protection from bad actors.111 
But the harsh criminalization of human smuggling has “tipped [the power 
dynamic between smuggler and migrant] in favor of the smuggler, eroding the 
safeguards traditionally protecting migrants and making them increasingly 
vulnerable to abuse.”112 Whenever the state constructs a novel barrier for irregular 
migrants by, for example, militarizing a border section or initiating a law 
enforcement crackdown in a migration hub, demand for smuggling services 
increases. The smuggling market responds by offering new and increasingly risky 
routes and raising prices to compensate for the increased risk. As fees and demand 
simultaneously increase, the ability of migrants to pay upfront decreases. This 
means that migrants are more likely to exchange promises of free labor for a 
smuggling journey, which renders them more susceptible to exploitation and debt 
bondage.113 
For example, Thailand is one of the world’s largest fishery exporters and has 
repeatedly come under fire for failing to address the prevalence of forced labor 
and victims of trafficking in its fisheries.114 As the Thai government has “sought 
to balance negative public attitudes about migration…with strong economic 
demand for low-cost labor,” they have engaged in “contradictory and inconsistent 
migration policymaking.”115 Limited opportunity for legal migration of low-skilled 
workers has pushed migrants (predominantly from Burma and Cambodia) 
towards “more expensive and less safe border crossings, thereby increasing profits 
for smugglers and traffickers.” In short, “[t]he higher the barriers and the more 
complex the routes, the higher the demand for smugglers becomes, the more 
specialized they need to be and, consequently, the more they charge.”116 And the 
more they charge, the more likely it is that their clients will be unable to pay those 
charges without becoming exploited.117 Climate change will exacerbate these 
dynamics by increasing the demand for smuggling services and simultaneously 
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implementing new types of physical and political barriers, a point which will be 
further elaborated upon in the next Section. 
Treating smuggling and trafficking “as twin threats” in this way “allows 
partners to take [ ] relatively neutral and security-focused actions to combat 
‘trafficking,’ while overlooking the broader requirements for suppressing 
smuggling and better managing migration [and] at the same time claiming to have 
complied with the spirit of an international agreement [on trafficking].”118 This 
strategy contributes to the project of building a nation state by contributing to an 
“us” and “them” mentality drawn along sovereign borders. Antitrafficking 
discourse and policymaking has drawn upon and perpetuated “myths of migrant 
criminality”119 by depicting traffickers as noncitizen men, particularly noncitizen 
men of color, in a way that is completely detached from the complicity of citizen 
consumers of trafficked labor.120 This framing “fits comfortably within the larger 
narrative that has been constructed around unauthorized migration”121 and 
justifies extensive border control efforts “that may, ironically, give traffickers 
more business.”122 
In addition to being premised upon oversimplified conceptions of gender 
and shortsighted views of the consequences of a securitized response to human 
smuggling, the smuggling-trafficking binary presents state governments with 
misplaced incentives. The stark differences between what is owed to someone 
who is smuggled and someone who is trafficked mean that fighting human 
smuggling is more expedient and less resource intensive. States are incentivized to 
“see all trafficked people—non-consenting ‘victims’ and consenting adults—as 
people who have consented to enter [the country] illegally and therefore are not 
in need of protection.”123 
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As the impacts of climate change become more severe, such that deporting 
people to their place of origin becomes an increasingly inhumane option, it will 
be important to ensure that states are not (whether accidentally or intentionally) 
dismissing bona fide victims of trafficking as people who have willingly 
participated in smuggling. In addition, deportation will not address the cyclical 
nature of the climate change-human trafficking nexus: many people are likely to 
attempt the perilous journey to another country again after deportation, since the 
on-the-ground conditions in their place of origin will likely only have deteriorated. 
This Comment thus operates within the context of this smuggling-trafficking 
binary and seeks to illustrate how climate change will continue to disrupt the bases 
upon which the binary is built. 
III.  THE CLIMATE CHANGE-HUMAN TRAFFICKING NEXUS  
In 2019, natural disasters displaced 22 million people globally.124 This 
number is more than twice the yearly average number of people who are displaced 
due to violence, underscoring that environmental degradation—not human 
conflict—is one of the most significant drivers of instability on our planet.125 
Moreover, environmental degradation and human conflict will likely continue to 
intersect, with disastrous consequences. For example, one study on the Syrian war 
and refugee crisis concluded that persistent drought attributable to climate change 
led 1.5 million Syrian farmers to move from rural areas into overcrowded cities in 
search of work, “contributing to social turmoil and ultimately a civil war.”126 
Over the last few decades, anthropogenic climate change has more than 
doubled the frequency of natural disasters that lead to widespread displacement 
and insecurity.127 Legal and policy responses to climate-induced migration have 
been few and far between, in part because distinguishing “climate change 
migrants” from “economic migrants” is difficult, since “migration is never solely 
due to climate change, but rather a compounding result of vulnerabilities.”128 
However, this Comment subscribes to a relatively maximalist understanding 
of environmental migration by asserting that environmental migration does exist 
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and can be identified as a distinct phenomenon.129 Such an approach is already 
prevalent in the scholarship on climate change and migration. One notable 
example is the typology offered by Fabrice Renaud et al., which provides three 
categories of climate change-induced migrants: (1) environmental refugees, who 
flee immediately after sudden onset disasters, (2) environmentally forced migrants, 
who have to migrate to avoid destitution, and (3) environmentally motivated 
migrants, who proactively leave an area impacted by slow onset disasters “in order 
to preempt the worse.”130 Additionally, advancements in climate science will 
continue to offer solutions to problems of proof and causality. Through extreme 
event attribution, for example, scientists are now able to calculate with increasing 
levels of certainty the impact of anthropogenic climate change on the occurrence 
and severity of natural disasters.131 
Of course, climate change and environmental degradation never act in 
isolation. Climate change is a vulnerability multiplier, meaning that its impacts 
greatly exacerbate pre-existing conditions, such as water and food shortages, 
poverty, low educational attainment, and gender inequality, that make people 
vulnerable to the recruitment of human traffickers.132 The above discussion 
illustrates how climate change may be sufficiently isolated so as to identify a 
distinct group of people who are trafficked as a result of climate vulnerability. 
Despite ongoing issues of multicausality, empirical evidence makes clear that 
climate change is responsible for a growing number of natural disasters that lead 
to displacement and force people into desperate situations where they are more 
likely to be trafficked.133 Given this urgency, the multicausal nature of the climate 
change-human trafficking nexus “should not be an excuse to ignore the necessity 
of developing a protection framework for climate-induced displacement.”134 
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A.  Environmental Mechanisms Impacting Human Trafficking  
There are two primary environmental mechanisms through which climate 
change impacts human trafficking: sudden onset disasters and slow onset 
disasters.135 In general, sudden onset disasters “lead to mass amounts of displaced 
persons leaving quickly, while [slow onset disasters] steadily bring strife to natural 
resources, employment prospects, and agricultural accessibility, leading to a slow 
movement of people out of the area.”136 Disaster-related displacement is rarely 
driven by a sudden or slow onset event alone; instead, environmental factors work 
in tandem with socioeconomic and political factors that curtail or eliminate 
people’s ability to stay in their habitual land.137 Additionally, sudden and slow onset 
disasters may simultaneously impact certain regions, furthering the destructive 
effects. 
Importantly, the consequences of the displacement and migration spurred 
by sudden and slow onset disasters are not yet fully known.138 In the absence of 
comprehensive data, the ensuing discussion about the mechanisms underlying the 
climate change-human trafficking nexus provides a coherent narrative by utilizing 
disparate case studies and common-sense assumptions. 
1. Sudden Onset Disasters 
Sudden onset disasters are unexpected and rapidly developing 
environmental events such as flooding, mudslides, earthquakes, and tsunamis.139  
Climate change is expected to significantly increase the intensity, unpredictability, 
and number of sudden onset disasters.140 These disasters frequently “cause 
unexpected loss of land and lives, and destruction of means of livelihoods, 
instantly plunging those without safety nets into poverty.”141 Since 2004, the IOM 
has monitored trafficking trends after natural disasters and incorporated the issue 
of post-disaster trafficking into its crisis response frameworks.142 As a result, a 
substantial amount of research on post-disaster trafficking patterns has been 
conducted. Although this research has yet to incorporate explicit discussions of 
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the impact of climate change, the data establishes a strong positive correlation 
between the severity of natural disasters and increased rates in human 
trafficking.143 
For example, after Hurricane Harvey wreaked havoc in 2017 in the American 
South, law enforcement agents, policymakers, and journalists documented 
increases in trafficking, especially sex trafficking.144 Former Congresswoman 
Linda Smith analyzes human trafficking through fundamental market principles, 
noting that “if someone is going to pay good money, lots of money, somebody 
else is going to bring a product to that market.”145 Sudden onset disasters 
frequently have an impact on both the supply and demand side of the trafficking 
market. For example, after Hurricane Harvey, women were more likely to lose 
their jobs and homes and thus become ready targets for traffickers, and hundreds 
or thousands of male aid workers arrived in the area as potential ‘customers.’146 
These patterns are facilitated by the widespread prevalence of smartphones, as the 
internet provides an easy and relatively discrete way for traffickers to recruit both 
customers and victims. Smartphone usage is increasing rapidly across the globe, 
such that people who lose their homes and livelihoods in a disaster are likely to 
retain their mobile phone and internet connection.147 
In addition to sex trafficking, sudden onset disasters are also likely to lead to 
trafficking for forced labor. As the number of natural disasters increases, the 
capacity of the international humanitarian aid system to adequately respond will 
continue to decrease. This will lead to more and more victims of natural disasters 
undertaking migration journeys. When these journeys stay within the borders of 
the individual’s state of origin, they are likely to involve moving from rural 
agricultural areas to urban slums, and research indicates that people in this 
situation are highly vulnerable to trafficking recruitment efforts.148 
If an individual’s migration journey involves crossing an international 
border, they are likely to “seek assistance from human smugglers, [which 
subsequently] plac[es] them[] at risk of many of the forms of exploitation that are 
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commonly associated with trafficking, such as sexual exploitation, forced labour, 
forced marriage, as well as organ removal.”149 Global responses to the refugee 
crises of the last few decades—in particular, the hostility of receiving countries to 
forced migrants and lack of political will to facilitate legal migration—indicate that 
use of smugglers will only continue to increase.150 As a result of climate change, 
people have fewer viable options for livelihoods and simultaneously experience 
displacement more frequently. Thus, disaster-induced migration, regardless of the 
immediacy with which migration begins or the duration and extent of the 
migration, places people in positions of vulnerability to trafficking. Climate change 
will significantly impact rates of disaster-induced migration and, by extension, 
trafficking. 
2. Slow Onset Disasters 
Slow onset disasters include drought, coastal erosion, desertification, 
salinization, sea level rise, and glacial retreat.151 Because slow onset disasters occur 
over time, there may be more opportunity for the development of mitigation and 
adaptation systems and infrastructure to offset their negative impacts, but these 
measures require access to resources. This means that communities with fewer 
resources (who were already more vulnerable to trafficking) are less likely to be 
insulated from the impacts of slow onset disasters and more likely to resort to 
migration as a “necessary tool for survival.”152 
In addition to being a last-resort survival mechanism, migration is a key 
proactive strategy to diversify income in the face of environmental degradation 
that challenges the sustainability of traditional agricultural livelihoods.153 As with 
sudden onset disasters, migration may be intrastate or involve crossing an 
international border, but in either scenario, increased vulnerability to trafficking is 
a likely result.154 Moreover, “households with extremely limited resources may not 
be able to migrate at all,” and “[a]s these households remain in inhospitable 
environments associated with intensifying deprivation, [their] members are also 
made [increasingly] vulnerable to trafficking.”155 There is a particular concern 
about inhabitants of very rural areas, who may not have the ability to migrate and 
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may receive delayed or limited assistance by governments and humanitarian 
organizations after a disaster.156 
A case study from the Sundarbans region of West Bengal, India, may serve 
to further illustrate how these mechanisms will operate within the climate change-
human trafficking nexus. The Sundarbans is a region of low-lying islands with a 
population of 4.4 million people, the vast majority of whom experience “severe 
impoverishment and insecurity.”157 Gender inequities are prevalent, particularly in 
regards to educational attainment, workforce participation, and gender-based 
violence.158 In addition, the region is home to a number of particularly vulnerable 
populations, including a high number of “undocumented Bangladeshi migrants 
and landless households that have historically and contemporaneously faced 
discrimination, marginalization, and poverty.”159 The Sundarbans contain one of 
the world’s largest and most biodiverse mangrove ecosystems on earth, and the 
region’s peoples have long relied on the soil and water of this ecosystem.160 But in 
recent years, “[s]tronger and more recurrent floods and cyclones, erratic rainfall, 
increased temperatures, and encroaching sea-level rise have contributed to soil 
and water salinization, crop losses, soil infertility, and significant long-term 
reductions in agricultural yields, adversely impacting local livelihoods.”161 
In the face of converging environmental challenges, many of those who are 
able to do so have chosen to migrate in search of better prospects and greater 
security.162 This migration occurs steadily as slow onset disasters progress and 
spikes as a result of sudden onset disasters. For example, in 2009, after Cyclone 
Aila swept through the region, seventy-five percent of households in the 
Sundarbans reported that at least one family member had migrated out of the 
region in search of labor, and children comprised twenty percent of those 
migrating.163 
This type of irregular and insecure labor migration—often, as in this case, 
undertaken in the context of “degraded environments, unviable livelihoods, 
destitute, and survival need”164—is highly likely to amplify vulnerability to 
trafficking for forced labor and sexual exploitation. But there may be little 
alternative; the same unsustainable conditions that compel people to undertake 
perilous journeys in search of survival simultaneously impede their ability to return 
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home if they do become the subject of trafficking and exploitation.165 This is a 
unique aspect of people who are trafficked due to climate change-induced 
vulnerability: once freed from a trafficking situation, there may be no safe home 
to which they can return. 
3. Cycles of Causality 
Human trafficking is not only an effect of climate change but also undergirds 
the structural systems that cause climate change and worsen its impacts. Many of 
the industries that contribute to environmental degradation are “underpinned by 
large numbers of migrant workers in forced labor situations” who often enter 
these situations as a result of being trafficked.166 For example, the lucrative palm 
oil industry in South East Asia is responsible for widespread rainforest destruction 
and is “heavily dependent on less-than-ethical recruitment of foreign labour, as 
well as coercive labour practices.”167 In fact, data suggests that “up to half of illegal 
deforestation globally is dependent on slave labour” and these practices are 
estimated to be responsible for emitting an estimated 2.54 billion tons of carbon 
dioxide each year—more than any nation in the world except for China and the 
U.S.168 
Fishing is another global industry that simultaneously worsens the impact of 
climate change169 and relies on modern slavery to make up its workforce and 
supply chains.170 The IOM seeks to highlight the prevalence of forced labor in 
fishing and provide assistance to victims of trafficking on fishing boats and within 
onshore seafood processing facilities.171 In 2017, the IOM’s Global Assistance 
Fund, which serves trafficking victims and other vulnerable migrants, took part in 
efforts to assist 600 men who were found in forced labor situations on fishing 
boats (from various nations) in Indonesian waters: 
Some had not been on dry land for years. One of the victims had been 
separated from his family, without any contact, for 22 years. . . . Many migrant 
fishers enter the destination country through networks of recruitment agents, 
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often incurring high brokerage fees, even when they are engaged through 
legally recognised recruitment agencies, leading to personal debts that must 
be repaid through deductions from wages. And when the labour brokerage is 
informal and the workers have no contracts of employment, there is 
considerable risk of further abuse. Debt bondage in the context of labour 
migration and trafficking is a trend that can be seen across a number of 
countries and sectors.172 
There is a third layer of causality, too: as the impacts of climate change are 
more keenly felt, such as ocean acidification, increased prevalence and severity of 
storms, and declining fish stocks, fisheries face increased economic pressure and 
are “forced to extend their operations, both geographically and temporally, for 
‘ever diminishing returns’ of fish catches.”173 As the market becomes more 
competitive and economic pressures on fisheries increase, the appeal of utilizing 
low-cost forced labor increases and demand for trafficked workers grows.174 
B.  Predicted Impacts  
1. Increased Number of People Impacted by Trafficking 
Climate change has already begun to increase the number of people who 
become victims of human trafficking.175 Although scientists have varying 
estimates of the exact rate at which the impacts of climate change will worsen, 
there is consensus that we are just at the beginning of witnessing these effects.176 
Time is “fast running out for [humans] to avert the worst impacts of climate 
disruption.”177 The next few years are a critical tipping point for worldwide action 
on climate change, and international will to take action is being challenged in 
unprecedented ways by the COVID-19 pandemic and faltering economies.178 
Through the mechanisms discussed in the previous Part, it is almost certain that 
climate change will lead to a large increase in the number of people who become 
vulnerable to the recruitment efforts of traffickers. 
In addition to an increased number of trafficking victims, evidence suggests 
that climate-related environmental degradation will contribute to a simultaneous 
rise in the number of people who collude with traffickers or become active 
traffickers themselves. This is especially true after sudden onset disasters, when a 
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sharp spike in the supply of trafficking victims will necessarily contribute to a high 
demand for traffickers to facilitate the distribution of these trafficked people into 
forced labor situations.179 
2. Altered Methods of Trafficking 
In its 2018 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, the UNODC reported that 
fifty-eight percent of trafficking victims were detected within their own borders, 
and eighty-six percent were detected within the same sub-region of their point of 
origin.180 Thus, current trafficking data indicates that the crime predominantly 
occurs close to the victim’s point of origin. The subset of trafficked people who 
arise from the climate change-human trafficking nexus will likely dramatically 
change these patterns, as more people will need to travel far away from home to 
escape the impact of environmental degradation. 
Additionally, as discussed in Section II, increased rates of climate-related 
migration are likely to be accompanied by a growing willingness on the part of 
human smugglers to provide loans for their customers:181 
[smuggling] recruiters encourage migrants who lack the funds needed to 
embark on their journey on the understanding that they can work to earn the 
fee at a later point in the journey . . . in most cases, migrants find themselves 
working as temporary indentured labor . . . it has become increasingly 
common for the ‘pay later’ migrant to be kidnapped and held for ransom . . . 
[t]he migrant may be forced to work for the kidnap gang while being held . . . . 
In other instances, debt collectors seek payment at the end of the journey . . . 
these debt collectors [often] have links to human-trafficking networks and, in 
the likely scenario that the migrant is unable to pay, the migrant is sold to 
traffickers in lieu of payment.182 
Humanitarian practitioners have already noticed a significant increase in 
these ‘migrate now, pay later’ smuggling schemes, which offer unprecedented 
mobility opportunities to the poorest segments of society for whom migration 
was “previously unthinkable.”183 Another implication of the rising prevalence of 
these schemes is that the rising price of smuggling services due to market forces 
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will do “little to quash demand, and migrants will merely seek alternative methods 
to pay, compromising their safety in the process.”184 
The increased willingness of smugglers to engage in these schemes 
undoubtedly contributes to rising rates of debt bondage as a mechanism of 
coercion.185 A recent report presented to the U.N. Human Rights Council found 
that debt bondage is the primary means used to control trafficking victims in 
North America, Europe and the Middle East and is prevalent across a wide variety 
of sectors including construction work, domestic work, agricultural work, factory 
work, and sex work.186 The converging influences of climate-induced migration 
and related changes in the human smuggling market will result in some of society’s 
most vulnerable people becoming at risk of trafficking in new ways. 
IV.  THE TRAFFICKING PROTOCOL APPLIES TO VICTIMS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE  
This Comment has so far sought to situate the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus within the existing legal frameworks that govern these issues and 
illuminate the mechanisms underlying the nexus. In this Section, the Comment 
argues that part of the response to the climate change-human trafficking nexus 
involves recognizing that the Trafficking Protocol provides a textual basis for 
extending its protections to victims of climate change. This argument is not 
without its challenges. Climate change-induced vulnerability necessarily “entails 
uneven, uncertain, and complex processes contingent on myriad factors, [which] 
does not fit neatly into dominant criminal justice-oriented anti-trafficking 
initiatives.”187 The ways in which states have thus far implemented the Trafficking 
Protocol very much reflect “particular forms and dynamics of capitalism and 
capital and state relations that structure conditions of insecurity and 
exploitation.”188 Effective responses to the nexus compel the interrogation of 
“broader contemporary capitalist modes of production and [ ] the need for 
continual capital accumulation.”189 In short, the climate change-human trafficking 
nexus complicates mainstream narratives about trafficking. 
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In contrast to the story of “inherently vulnerable women being sold or 
abducted and forced into sexual slavery”190 and the state stepping in to play hero, 
the application of the Trafficking Protocol to people experiencing climate-related 
vulnerability requires acknowledging the reality of climate change as something 
that the global North (namely the U.S. and the 28 E.U. member states, and not 
including China) has historically contributed to, with people in the global South 
bearing many of the worst impacts.191 Additionally, “blame and responsibility for 
the conditions and outcomes of [the climate change-human trafficking nexus] 
cannot be easily pinned to deviant and malevolent perpetrators, organized crime 
rings, or patriarchal, backward communities,” as much of the blame lies squarely 
on developed Western nations.192 
A.  Victims of Climate Change are in a Position of Vulnerability  
The wide range of potential means included in Article 3 of the Trafficking 
Protocol “generally confirms the position . . . that individuals can end up in a 
situation of exploitation through indirect methods such as deception and fraud as 
well as by sheer physical force.”193 This Comment argues that victims of climate 
change who are trafficked fulfill the means component of the Trafficking Protocol 
definition because these traffickers will have necessarily engaged in an “abuse of 
a position of vulnerability” (APOV) by taking advantage of climate-related 
vulnerability. In part, this Comment is motivated by and seeks to overcome 
prominent global trends in the prosecution of trafficking that establish the 
presence of an implicit presumption against someone being a victim of trafficking 
when overt, physical means are not present in the case.194 
This approach is less radical than it may initially seem. Criminal justice 
systems are already “routinely being called on to distinguish between situations 
characterized by poor conditions of employment and situations where a person is 
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the victim of trafficking.”195 This Comment suggests, then, that criminal justice 
systems incorporate an additional factor into their analysis: the presence (or 
absence) of climate-induced vulnerability. When the temporal and causal 
connection between the situation and the experienced environmental degradation 
is sufficiently strong and is accompanied by evidence of an intent to exploit, 
decision makers should consider this to strongly indicate that an abuse of a 
position of vulnerability has occurred, thereby fulfilling the definition of the 
Trafficking Protocol. 
APOV remains a relatively vague, undefined, and under-litigated component 
of the Trafficking Protocol. Scholars and practitioners to date have not 
substantively discussed whether “there needs to be requisite seriousness or the 
extent of the . . . abuse of a position of vulnerability that could constitute a ‘means’ 
for the purposes of the definition of trafficking.”196 Despite this vagueness, APOV 
is widely viewed as a “distinct and important part of the international legal 
definition of trafficking” and has endured the test of time, having “survived intact 
in all major treaties adopted after the Protocol that incorporate a definition of 
trafficking in persons, as well as in policy documents and interpretative texts.”197 
While the formal legislative history of the Trafficking Protocol “does not 
shed light on how or why the concept [of APOV] was included,” the UNODC 
notes that informal records indicate that its inclusion was “motivated by an 
intention to ensure that all the different and subtle ways by which an individual 
can be moved, placed or maintained in a situation of exploitation were 
captured.”198 The drafting history and Legislative Guide of the Trafficking 
Protocol offer some—albeit slightly circular in nature—elaboration by explaining 
that APOV “is understood to refer to any situation in which the person involved 
has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.”199 It 
is certainly arguable that a wide range of applications of this interpretation would 
comport with conceptions of climate-induced vulnerability that push people into 
perilous migration journeys or exploitative conditions with no real alternatives.200 
The UNODC has noted that establishing APOV generally requires two 
distinct evidentiary findings: (1) “proof of the existence of a position of 
vulnerability on the part of the victim,” and (2) “proof of abuse of (or intention 
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to abuse) that vulnerability as the means by which a particular act (recruitment, 
harboring, etc.) was undertaken.”201 Surveys of countries that have APOV within 
their domestic definition of trafficking reveal that in practice, “the focus of the 
inquiry is generally on establishing the fact of vulnerability, rather than on proving 
its abuse.”202 This reality establishes some precedent for this Comment’s proposal 
that adjudicators and decision makers take the existence of climate-related 
vulnerability, once proven, as a strong indication of the presence of abuse. 
Though few in number, prior applications of APOV support this 
Comment’s argument for the application of APOV to climate-related 
vulnerability. In Belgium, domestic legislation implementing the Trafficking 
Protocol specifically enumerated examples of positions of vulnerability such as 
“illegal or uncertain immigration or residency status, minority status, or conditions 
such as illness, pregnancy, or physical or mental disability.”203 Academic literature 
considers North Korean women who are living in China in situations of 
exploitative labor or sexual exploitation to be trafficked through the “abuse of 
their vulnerable position as refugees who fear deportation.”204 
In addition, scholars have argued that foreign brides who initially consent to 
travel to another country and marry their husband sight unseen fulfill the 
definition set for in the Trafficking Protocol because recruiters abuse the 
vulnerabilities “that come from the woman’s national experience from political, 
legal, economic, and social structures that are not experienced by their husbands 
by virtue of his gender and nationality.”205 These examples bolster the argument 
that APOV already encompasses a wide variety of vulnerabilities and may be 
properly extended to include environmental vulnerabilities. 
B.  Consent is Not Dispositive  
The climate change-human trafficking nexus further complicates existing 
debates about the applicability of “traditional liberal theory that emphasizes the 
free will of people to make choices about their lives” to human trafficking.206 
Consent is likely to be at issue in many of the situations that arise from climate 
change-related environmental degradation and resulting exploitation. For many 
people, beginning a migration journey that entails enlisting the services of a 
smuggler or undertaking labor in exploitative conditions may be the best or only 
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option in light of the devastating impacts arising from both sudden and slow onset 
environmental disasters. 
Choice and coercion represent a spectrum, rather than a binary. It is highly 
likely that many of the trafficking situations considered in this Comment will 
involve some level of implied or express consent. This is their position of 
vulnerability, and when abuse of that position has occurred, then the means of 
trafficking in the Trafficking Protocol has been established and the consent of the 
trafficked person becomes irrelevant.207 Indeed, the UNODC has anticipated 
exactly this type of issues, noting that “[i]n cases where more ‘indirect’ or ‘subtle’ 
means [of trafficking] are used,” such as APOV, then “indications or assertions 
of consent are more likely to be raised” and become central to “ascertaining 
whether a crime of trafficking in persons has in fact been committed.”208 
In some jurisdictions the relationship between consent and APOV is made 
explicit. In Moldova, for example, APOV is in fact only considered as a potential 
means when the victim has provided consent: the prosecution then uses the 
victim’s vulnerability to “explain away and nullify the apparent consent.”209 
The UNODC has issued guidance that comports with the position of this 
Comment that consent is not a barrier to applying the Trafficking Protocol within 
the context of the climate change-human trafficking nexus. Specifically, in 
discussing the role of consent in criminal cases within Anglo-American common 
law, the UNODC has noted that the Trafficking Protocol “does not precisely 
correspond” to common law conceptions of consent.210 At common law, the key 
inquiry is whether the coercive circumstances have been caused by the person to 
whom consent is given.211 Thus, “a person’s compulsion to choose between 
working or starving does not render the apparent consent to work involuntary,” 
so long as the employer did not directly cause the conditions giving rise to this 
choiceless choice.212 The UNODC explicitly notes that this view does not extend 
to the Trafficking Protocol’s position on APOV; there, “the person to whom 
consent is given must have abused an existing or created vulnerability (the origin 
of which is irrelevant) in order to secure an act intended to result in 
exploitation.”213 
There is also some indication that this Comment’s position may find support 
among practitioners. In a global survey of antitrafficking practitioners, the 
UNODC found “widespread agreement” among interviewees that legitimizing 
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consent to exploitative labor conditions by people “who are made vulnerable 
through lack of economic alternatives” would “fail to uphold basic principles of 
human dignity and non-discrimination.”214 However, many practitioners rejected 
the idea that people who lack economic alternatives and undertake work in 
exploitative labor conditions should always be considered to be victims of 
trafficking, as this idea was “unrealistic and unworkable in competitive and 
difficult labor markets.”215 Climate-related vulnerability, coupled with an abuse of 
that vulnerability and an intent to exploit, contains more limiting principles than 
does the hazy notion of “lack of economic alternatives.” This group of people can 
be distinguished from other economic migrants because the situation that compels 
such consent is the product of intentional global state action (through the release 
of greenhouse gases).216 
Moreover, practitioners expressed support for requiring legal decision 
makers to consider the full range of circumstances under which consent was given, 
including the “cultural, socioeconomic and psychological situation of the victim 
before the trafficking occurred.”217 The presence of climate-related vulnerability 
and experienced environmental degradation would be a highly relevant and 
determinative factor in these considerations. 
Maintaining clear boundaries of the limiting principles governing the 
application of the Trafficking Protocol to the climate change-human trafficking 
nexus will be highly important. Climate change is likely to further exacerbate 
cyclical patterns of coercion and choice by severely restricting the options 
available to people who are trafficked. This will be true even once they are no 
longer in the control of their traffickers or being directly coerced. For example, 
recent research in the Philippines has documented how many women who were 
trafficked as teenagers for sexual exploitation gain their freedom and return to 
their home villages, only to later opt to return to urban centers as sex workers 
because their villages are experiencing devastating environmental degradation and 
offer limited routes to survival.218 
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Decision makers should respond to this complicated intersection between 
choice and coercion by interpreting what it means to ‘abuse’ the position of 
vulnerability that people impacted by climate change may find themselves in. 
These interpretations may continuously be updated and adapted to ensure that the 
right balance is being struck. This tension is hardly novel; stakeholders of the 
Trafficking Protocol have long discussed the risk that “a liberal interpretation of 
the more ambiguous means—including a low threshold for establishing abuse of 
a position of vulnerability—can result in apparent consent being overridden to 
the point that “trafficking” comes to include a very broad range of conduct that 
otherwise may be treated as a lesser offence.”219 
Over-inclusion is a very real concern, one that must be taken seriously. 
However, as this Comment’s exploration of the climate change-human trafficking 
nexus highlights, under-inclusion is also a critical point of fallibility in the fight 
against human trafficking. The answer to this tension is to develop a nuanced and 
multi-factor standard by which individual cases may be assessed, rather than 
wholesale exclusion of cases where consent may be an issue.220 
V.  CONCLUSION  
This Comment has demonstrated that the Trafficking Protocol may be fairly 
applied to people who are made vulnerable or displaced as a result of climate 
change and subsequently become victims of trafficking through the abuse of this 
vulnerable position. This legal solution could help to decrease the protection gap 
for millions of people who may become trafficked because climate change has 
exacerbated their existing vulnerabilities or forced them to flee from their home. 
Of course, successfully applying the Trafficking Protocol in this way greatly 
depends on whether individual countries incorporate such an approach into their 
existing domestic trafficking laws. To effectively combat human trafficking as a 
result of climate change, the international community and the signatory states of 
the Trafficking Protocol must recognize the mechanisms and power dynamics 
underpinning the climate change-human trafficking nexus and commit to a 
holistic antitrafficking approach that proactively prevents climate-related 
vulnerability, recognizes and protects people who are trafficked as a result of 
climate change, and prosecutes those who exploit climate migrants and climate-
impacted people. There is room to critique both the viability and suitability of this 
legal solution. 
The Trafficking Protocol already receives sharp criticism on all sides, and 
many of these critiques gain fresh potency in the context of the climate change-
human trafficking nexus and this Comment’s argument. One principal critique 
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views the Trafficking Protocol as a politically motivated band-aid solution to 
systemic global inequities.221 Critics contend that although the Trafficking 
Protocol sets forth three primary purposes (prosecuting traffickers, protecting 
people who are trafficked, and preventing trafficking in the first place), states are 
in practice overly focused on prosecution, emphasizing crime control at the 
expense of human rights protections.222 Through heavy criminalization of 
trafficking and sporadic prosecution of traffickers, states are able to clearly define 
a bad actor against whom they have taken action and create a fictional account 
wherein the state’s own behavior is irrelevant.223 In this way, states can avoid any 
meaningful acknowledgment of and response to “the underlying social, economic, 
political, and environmental drivers of vulnerability to trafficking” and instead 
continue to ignore the “material conditions and power relations that contribute to 
[that] vulnerability.”224 
Extending legal protections to victims of climate change under the 
Trafficking Protocol may well become yet another band-aid solution. It is entirely 
possible that the existence of a legal safety net for people suffering within the 
climate change-human trafficking nexus could cause state and non-governmental 
actors to approach preemptive action with less urgency. This Comment takes the 
position that this concern should be assuaged not through wholesale rejection of 
post-disaster legal protections, but instead through vigorous advocacy for pairing 
legal protective solutions with extensive efforts to prevent the vulnerabilities that 
lead to trafficking in the first place. Such efforts should include “protecting legal 
economics and ecologies, strengthening social supports and entitlements, 
guaranteeing labour and migration rights and protections, supporting and 
diversifying local livelihoods, and ensuring meaningful climate action.”225 Both the 
law226 and our sense of justice compel the diligent pursuit of these proactive efforts 
to meaningfully protect and provide for the most vulnerable people in our world. 
Nowhere is this truer than within the context of the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus—a monster of our own making. 
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